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18 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Executive Director

SUBJECT: Agency's Relationship with the PFIAB

REFERENCE: DCI Memorandum dated 29 October 1982, Same Subject

1. The present PFIAB appears to be trying to accomplish more in a shorter time than did its predecessors. The range of topics pursued and frequency of its formal meetings are about the same as under earlier Administrations. Former DCI's participated in most, if not all, of the Board's formal sessions, which were held about six times a year. Unlike the present rather frequent interaction between Board members and middle-level Agency officials, previous contacts with the Board appear to have been primarily at the DCI level and involved preparations for, or follow-up sessions related to, formal Board sessions. There may have been interaction between PFIAB, and its staff, and the Agency at the working levels, but this activity is not reflected in our files.

2. PFIAB has been concerned with a wide variety of topics, ranging from individual Station expenditures to broad issues of organization, DCI authority and Congressional oversight. Many of the present Board's interests--independent analysis, concealment and deception, strategic verification, quality of analysis, Bloc activities in the U.S., counterintelligence capabilities--were on previous agenda and reflect interests of members who were carried over from previous Boards.

3. Results have been mixed. The significance of PFIAB's recommendations depend somewhat upon whether they are viewed from a PFIAB or Community vantage point. Often as not, the issues which gave birth to recommendations were already being acted upon independently of the Board's recommendations. No doubt, the Board's interest in an issue served to mobilize the Agency when a sharper focus was called for and the Board undoubtedly was an arbiter in policy and budgetary battles.

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4. Board activities often reflected problems of the time: The Eisenhower and Kennedy Boards looked at policy issues and organization; they claim credit for the establishment of the USIB, for the centralization of Defense intelligence activities, and the creation of the DDS&T. The Johnson Board devoted considerable time to questions involving East and Southeast Asia as well as to a Community information handling system and to NRO management arrangements between Defense and CIA. As for PFIAB's organization, most of the Boards appear to have worked together in executive session or in ad hoc groups. However, the 1966 Board formed 12 panels of 2-4 members. Seven were geographical. There was one panel each for Intelligence Community coordination, exploitation of S&T resources, national programs, intelligence processing and counterintelligence.

5. Attached are summaries of Board activity and a listing of some of their more significant recommendations. It is noteworthy that over the past 11 months PFIAB held six Board sessions. Its first semiannual report contained 18 recommendations to the President. This compares with a total of 16 recommendations by the Johnson Board and 70 recommendations in somewhat over five years of the Nixon Administration. Two of the more carefully prepared Board reports were a 1976 paper on the "Future of Intelligence" and a 1973 study prepared under Board Chairman Admiral Anderson which submitted recommendations for sustaining the preeminent position of U.S. Naval Forces. The Board took four months and travelled extensively before concluding that the Navy should be given top priority for defense budget resources.



Charles A. Briggs

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Attachments:

- Tab A - Summary of PFIAB Activity
- Tab B - Subjects of Concern to the PFIAB
- Tab C - Previous DCI Perceptions of the PFIAB

Summary of PFIAB Activity

<u>President Served</u>	<u>Number of Board Meetings</u>	<u>Number of Meetings with President</u>	<u>Recommendations Made to the President</u>
Reagan	6	3	18*
Ford	14	7	24
Nixon	35	8	70
Johnson	29	3	16
Kennedy	25	9	53
Eisenhower	19	5	42

*President agreed to the preparation of an independent analysis of the Soviet economy and, subsequently, to a 19th recommendation that CIA prepare a study of Soviet concealment and deception policies.

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Subjects of Concern to the PFIAB

I. Ford Board

- Met 14 times between 1974-1976 and with President seven times.

Subjects of concern to Board:

- Restoration of public confidence in intelligence institutions; improvement in information handling technology; reorganization of intelligence support to crisis management; [redacted]
Cubans in Angola; Chinese strategic weapons systems; NRO charter; comparative analysis; rebuilding CIA's image; DCI's relationship with Congress relative to the release of classified information; [redacted]
leaks; cover; automatic language transcripts; [redacted]
[redacted] capability to evaluate economic intelligence; policymaker guidance to the Intelligence Community; multidisciplinary trend analysis; communications security in the U.S.; Attorney General's guidelines on surveillance; relationships with Congress.

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Recommendations:

- Creation of NSC counterintelligence policy committee;
- Automation of language transcripts;
- Development of "models" of the world for the next 20 years;
- Renewal of efforts in the area of "net assessments," of weapons systems;
- Analysis of Soviet perceptions of the U.S.

Their recommendations resulted in:

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- An evaluation of the vulnerability of space reconnaissance systems;
- Approximately \$500,000 was spent on comparative analysis.
- A study was completed on Soviet concealment and deception.

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II. Nixon Board

Met 35 times between April 1969 and August 1974; met with President eight times. Board made 70 recommendations. These included:

- Establishment of a strategic net evaluation group;

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- The organization and management of the Intelligence Community;
- Two studies on economic intelligence;
- A study on agent intelligence collection;
- Annual assessments of the strategic threat facing the U.S.

Recommendations resulted in or contributed to:

- The establishment of a net evaluation office in the Pentagon;
- A Presidential directive on the organization and management of the Intelligence Community;
- Significant change in the preparation of strategic threat assessments;
- Major improvements in the collection, evaluation and utilization of economic intelligence;
- The establishment of the U.S. Intelligence Board's Human Sources Committee.

III. Johnson Board

Johnson Board met 29 times between January 1964 and January 1969. Met with the President three times. It submitted 16 recommendations which covered:

- Deficiencies in the collection and analysis of intelligence from Southeast Asia;
- Management of satellite reconnaissance systems;
- The development of sophisticated data storage and retrieval systems.

Recommendations resulted in:

- Numerous changes and augmentation in the collection, analysis and reporting of intelligence from Southeast Asia;
- Formal agreement between the Department of Defense and the CIA on the conduct and management of satellite reconnaissance programs;
- The initiation of a Community-wide program to develop an automated system for the central storage and retrieval by analysts of classified intelligence data.

IV. Kennedy Board

Board held 25 meetings; met with the President nine times and forwarded 53 recommendations.

These included:

- The reorganization of Defense intelligence to consolidate and centralize management;
- Acceleration of the development and deployment of photographic reconnaissance systems;
- The application of science and technology to intelligence;
- Measures to strengthen personnel security practices of NSA and to improve U.S. counterintelligence capabilities;
- Tighter policy coordination for covert action programs;
- A review of CIA paramilitary programs.

As a result:

- U.S. photo reconnaissance capabilities (from both aerodynamic and satellite platforms) were greatly improved;
- CIA established the Directorate of Science and Technology;
- Legislation was passed to exempt the National Security Agency from Civil Service procedures governing the hiring and firing of employees;
- FBI agents were assigned to counterintelligence responsibilities (sic);
- The functions of the 5412/2 Group were altered to assure political control and continuing review of CA and PM operations.

V. Eisenhower Board

During its five years tenure, the Eisenhower Board met 19 times in two-day sessions and met five times with the President. It submitted 19 recommendations. These were concerned with:

- The central direction and coordination of all U.S. intelligence activities;
- Signals intelligence and the management of the NSA;
- The strategic warning process;
- CIA's covert action programs.

The results:

- The establishment of the United States Intelligence Board;
- The introduction of machine data processing at the NSA, and raising the responsibility for management and direction of NSA to the level of an Assistant Secretary of Defense;
- Major improvements in the handling and timeliness of critical intelligence information;
- Better coordination and evaluation of covert action programs within the Executive Branch.

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Previous DCI Perceptions of the PFIAB

DCI McCone and DCI Helms appear to have found the Board less than useful as a supportive body for conveying report cards to the President or offering constructive suggestions to the Intelligence Community. The Board membership was scattered throughout the country and met only three or four times a year; its full energies were seldom fully harnessed. A great deal of work, much of which was not welcomed, was precipitated by the resident staff director in the White House; there was an inclination to get deep into operational matters and collection programs, specifically the NRO and some clandestine operations.

DCI Colby apparently welcomed Board initiatives and found it a useful buffer. There was interaction back and forth with Board which met bimonthly. He recommended to Board Chairman Admiral Anderson that the Board prepare an annual unclassified report on the state of the Community. He wanted to put it in the public domain and assure the public that the Community was performing well and strictly within existing guidelines. Admiral Anderson thought this was a good idea but eventually declined to pursue the suggestion out of deference to the Board's responsibility to the President.

DCI Raborn was uncomfortable over the Board holding meetings without him and the Board was asked to permit him to attend all formal Board meetings. The Board demurred.

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